Interview with a German officer in the headquarters of the Military Governor
of Rome
– L’Osservatore Romano
Th e following is a translation of an interview that German Offi cer, Nikolaus Kunkel, a witness to Pius XII’s
actions to save Roman Jews during the Second World War, gave to the German Catholic News Agency
(KNA) on November 7, 2000.
Now eighty years old, Mr. Kunkel, was a former German Offi cer at the Headquarters of the Military
Governor of Rome. He directly witnessed the SS roundup of the Jews and the fact that the majority of them
were saved by taking refuge in the Vatican. After the war, Kunkel worked as a bank manager. A lieutenant
at the time, he remembers those dramatic days at the end of 1943 when the SS wanted to take advantage of
the transition of power from Mussolini to Badoglio to carry out “the fi nal solution to the Jewish question”
in Rome too. Th e victims of Hitler’s racist policies were able, for the most part, to take refuge in the Vatican
thanks to Pius XII’s orders and thus to escape the fate intended for them.
KNA: Mr. Kunkel, on 10 September 1943, after the Badoglio government broke with the
Rome-Berlin Axis, the Wehrmacht occupied the Italian capital. Th e war diary of the supreme
command of the armed forces says in this regard: “Th e Wehrmacht will take care of protecting
Vatican City.” Th e 28 June 1964 edition of L’Osservatore della Domenica quotes Albrecht von
Kessel, collaborator of Ernst von Weizsäcker, German ambassador to the Vatican, according
to whom Hitler had always discussed the possibility of taking the Pope prisoner and deporting
him to the German Reich. Verbatim: “If the Pope were to oppose this measure, there was even
the possibility that he would be killed ‘while trying to escape.’” What is your recollection?
Kunkel: For the duration of my time in Rome, a good nine months, all of us offi cials
were convinced that any day, the order could arrive: “Occupy the Vatican.” In this event—
practically speaking, to save time—we had internally prepared a “mob plan,” which of course
is not found in the war diary. I am sure that the Vatican also considered this danger. Hitler’s
volatile nature made it realistic.
KNA: Th e fact that Pope Pius XII also saw this risk suggests that he had already prepared
a resignation statement if he were taken prisoner. It probably read like this: “Th ey can only
arrest Cardinal Pacelli, not the Pope.”
Kunkel: Fortunately it did not happen, but the risk was there.
KNA: Were there contacts between the German military governor of Rome, Luftwaff e Major
General Rainer Stahel, and the Vatican?
Kunkel: Th ere were many. Th e Vatican’s offi cial contact with us was Fr. Pankratius Pfeiff er,
the superior general of the Salvatorians, who often dealt with the general, but also with the
SS and the police. Th e so-called internal security of Rome was actually in the hands of the
police, who were guided by the SS and by Kappler.
KNA: Who really held the power? Was Kappler under the military governor?
Kunkel: De jure yes, but de facto the SS was a state within the state. Th erefore, yes, Kappler
was in communication with the general, but in reality, the SS led their own life, and we did
not know what went on within the SS hierarchy. In security questions, the SS more or less
gave the orders in collaboration with the Italian Fascist police . . .
KNA: So the police forces who had not changed sides with Badoglio . . .
Kunkel: Yes, and that played a considerable role. While Badoglio had joined the Allies,
Marshal Graziani, Mussolini’s war minister, still took his cue from the Germans.
KNA: A month and a half after the occupation of Rome, 16 October 1943, the SS ordered a
roundup of Jews. Was General Stahel, as military governor, informed of the roundup? Could
he have prevented it?
Kunkel: Around mid-October, there was a rumor that a special SS unit would be sent to the
city and lodged at a small hotel near Piazza Barberini. Th e unit’s task would be to deport the
Jews. Italy already had “racial laws” by the end of the 1930s; however, they were applied with
great tolerance. It seems that in Rome, there was already a sort of ghetto. When this rumor
proved to be true, General Stahel summoned and informed the offi cers of divisions 1A, 1B and
1C, saying that he was totally opposed to the operation. A few weeks after the beginning of a
new collaboration with the Italians under the direction of Graziani, a deportation of Roman
Jews would have caused ill will and unrest among the Roman people. We sensed that this
was not the general’s whole opinion—which lay deeper!—but this statement stressing public
order was a good explanation. Th e general continued saying that to stop this operation, he
would have to seek allies, above all in Berlin. To this end, Ernst von Weizsäcker, the German
ambassador to the Vatican, would have to help. In fact, von Weizsäcker had a reputation as
a cautious enemy of the Nazi regime. Th e general sent me to the ambassador with a sealed
letter. I did not read it, but the general told me that in the letter he asked the ambassador to
do all he could in Berlin to revoke the measure.
Kunkel: I recall that when I went to von Weizsäcker, I waited in an anteroom and became
angry because no one off ered me a chair. Th e ambassador left the room and shortly after
returned with the letter, this time sealed by him. He asked me to give the letter back to the
general and tell him that this time he “unfortunately could not be helpful.” I remember this
phrase perfectly. When I gave him back the letter, the general spoke—cautiously—in a very
detached way about the ambassador. After this, he telephoned Himmler, but I cannot say
anything for sure about that.
KNA: Roman Jews were rounded up on October 16. Th at same day, the rector of Santa
Maria dell’Anima, Bishop Alois Hudal, and Fr. Pankratius Pfeiff er called on the general and
gave him the “clear impression” that the Pope would turn to world public opinion if these
roundups were not immediately stopped. Th e next day, October 17, the order came from
Himmler to stop.
Kunkel: We had the impression that the SS had planned an action, but it reached a dead
end and became public. Today we know that about one thousand Jews were arrested. In our
opinion, most Roman Jews had got wind of the imminent SS action because of delays in the
preparations, and so many of them were saved.
KNA: Of about eight thousand Roman Jews, then seven thousand were saved?
Kunkel: We were certain that a large number of them were able to take refuge in Vatican
buildings, which are numerous in Rome. In fact, the persecuted were able to take refuge in
a relatively simple way.
KNA: 7,486 hid in the Vatican itself . . .
Kunkel: I don’t know the number.
KNA: In practice, how did it work? How were these Jews saved?
Kunkel: Probably by entering primarily from St. Peter’s Square. Th e other parts of the
Vatican, with their high walls, are not accessible, while in St Peter’s Square, there were only
two German guards on the border between Italy and Vatican City to prevent German soldiers
from entering Vatican territory in uniform. Civilians could freely cross this line.
KNA: Was this border between St. Peter’s Square and the city of Rome marked in any
way?
Kunkel: No. As it is today, there was just a curved line marked between the colonnades. Our
guards patrolled along this line.
KNA: Certainly, what Bishop Hudal and Father Pfeiff er said to General Stahel is worth
noting: if the roundups of the Jews had been carried out, Pope Pius XII would have vigorously
protested and would have pressured Himmler to stop the action!
Kunkel: Th at was how it seemed to us at the time. We had the impression that the SS action
had been delayed until most Jews had reached safety. We considered it a success that only one
thousand of the eight thousand or nine thousand or so Jews were arrested by the SS. Today, of
course, one looks above all at the one thousand victims; at the time we saw the seven thousand
who did not become victims and were saved. But many people, institutions, and events
probably contributed to this rescue. By the way, a few days after the roundup and despite his
poor health, General Stahel—an old Catholic—was transferred to the eastern front.
KNA: And now the decisive question: do you think that a more vigorous protest from Pope
Pius XII would have saved more Jews in Rome, Italy, and occupied Europe?
Kunkel: At the time, I spoke about this with my immediate superior, Major Bohm, a Protestant
from Hamburg. We were both of the opinion that, faced with Hitler’s unpredictability, any
action directed to world public opinion by the Pope would have been harmful.
KNA: In his play Th e Deputy, Rolf Hochhuth expressed the opinion that Pius XII should have
made a blistering protest. Since the Pope did not do this, he is guilty of a grave omission.
Kunkel: It is easy to speak after the fact. In any case, we who were on the staff of the German
military governor of Rome were of the opinion that taking a vigorous stand would have had
negative consequences.
KNA: Would the supreme southern commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, with whom
Pope Pius XII was in contact, have had the power to stop the roundup of the Jews?
Kunkel: No. Th e power of the SS was so great that the Wehrmacht—to which Kesselring
belonged—could not have opposed it. Th at would have taken a successful 20 July!
KNA: In your opinion, can Pius XII be reproached for any of his actions?
Kunkel: Pius XII was in the most diffi cult political situation in which a man can fi nd himself.
I recall a conversation with a Jesuit, Fr. Otto Faller, concerning Germany’s war on two fronts.
He said to me: think that the Pope also fought a war on two fronts—against communism on
one side and against Nazism on the other. Th is refers to the general situation at the time. As
for your question: considering the circumstances, no one can reproach Pius XII or his actions.
If he had spoken out more strongly, it would certainly have provoked unpleasant reactions.
KNA: Might he eventually have been arrested?
Kunkel: Yes, there was also that possibility.
Below is a marble placard placed in Rome to honor the memory of Fr. Pancratius Pfeiff er. He was responsible,
through Pope Pius XII, for helping to end the arrests of the Roman Jews on October 16, 1943. On the right is
a marble placard placed by the Italian Israelite communities after the war’s end in 1946. Th is was in gratitude
for all Pope Pius XII did to save the Jews of Italy. Signed: Motion approved by the Th ird Congress of the
Italian Israelite Communities held in March 1946.
Th is memorial seems to have been removed and cannot be located today.
