Father P. Gumpel, SJ, Curia Gen. Compagnia di Gesu, Roma
THE GENERAL BEELITZ TESTIMONY
Statement by Fr. Peter Gumpel, SJ
Relator in the Beatifi cation Process of Pius XII
(recorded by Michael Hesemann)
A few years ago, I had the opportunity of a long phone conversation with the retired major general Dietrich
Beelitz because I wanted to know from him why Himmler, on October 16, 1943, at 2.00 p.m., so suddenly
gave the order to stop the arrest of the Roman Jews immediately, for the strange reason “due to the special
circumstances of the City of Rome.”
Th is had always remained an open question to me, and I wanted to hear from him whether he was able to
provide me with factual and certain information. Beelitz, at that time, was a colonel in the general staff and
the liaison offi cer between the headquarters of Field Marshal General Kesselring here in Italy on one side
and the Fuhrerhauptquartier (Adolf Hitler’s headquarter) on the other end (he was later promoted to major
general). When the fi eld marshal general spoke with the Fuhrerhauptquartier by phone, Beelitz had to listen
to the whole conversation and talk himself when Kesselring, once again, was away at the frontline. Major
General Beelitz had always refused to write his autobiography or even meet with journalists, and so it was
originally not easy for me to get in contact with him. What Beelitz told me during this conversation over
the telephone was the following:
On my question why Himmler suddenly gave the abovementioned order on October 16, 1943, Major General
Beelitz replied:
As I was aware before, the town commander of Rome, Major General Rainer Stahel, was
suddenly discharged by the end of October and sent to the Eastern frontline, to Russia.
He then made a farewell visit at the Headquarter of Field Marshall Kesselring. On this
opportunity, I had asked him personally about the reason and background of his sudden
and unexpected discharge. General Major Stahel replied that it was a retaliation measure by
Heinrich Himmler against him, since Himmler had realized in the meantime that Stahel had
persuaded him to cease the persecution of the Jews in Rome
What had really happened was the following:
Major General Stahel had fi rst sent his adjutant Nikolaus Kunkel to the German ambassador at the Holy See,
Ernst von Weizsäcker, with the urgent request that the ambassador should try to stop the campaign against
the Roman Jews. Kunkel gave an interview on this to the German Catholic news agency KNA in the year
2000, which was also published in the Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano. He confi rmed that he had
indeed received this order by Maj. Gen. Rainer Stahel but that von Weizsäcker just gave him a closed letter
for the major general and replied verbally that he unfortunately was not able to do anything in this aff air. As
Kunkel later confi rmed, the major general was indignant at this reply and decided to take this matter into his
own hands. In the presence of then lieutenant Kunkel, Stahel requested a direct call to Heinrich Himmler;
but when Stahel started to talk, Kunkel had left the offi ce and was not able to tell what was said on phone.
When he spoke with Beelitz, Rainer Stahel explained that he had pointed out in plain words that he, as town
commander of Rome, was responsible for the supply of the German divisions involved in combats in the
south of Italy and that he had the duty to maintain this supply. So he told Himmler that at daytime, these
transports became more and more diffi cult due to the air supremacy of the Anglo-American Forces, while at
night, the increasing number of partisans disturbed the supply. Th erefore, the major general told Himmler in
all openness that in the case that the campaign against the Jews would be continued, he would have to fear
revolts of the population, which could spread in the south of Rome and endanger the supply of the German
troops who would be lost in this case. At this opportunity, Stahel seems to have threatened Himmler directly
by stating that, in this case, he would have to take the responsibility for all consequences. Himmler, who was
quite ignorant about military aff airs, was obviously so impressed by this that he immediately ordered his SS
Forces to stop the arrests.
In reality, the risk of a revolt of the Roman population was nonexistant; the Romans were much too worried
about their personal safety, their own food supply, etc. Th erefore, the whole statement by Stahel was not based
on any real concern. Th is basically was what Maj. Gen. Dietrich Beelitz told me. When I asked if I could
publish his statement, he replied that he did not want this, but he would give me permission to quote it in
the so-called Positio for the Beatifi cation Process of Pius XII for whom he had a great personal admiration.
At that time, I had to promise Major General Beelitz not to publish his statement as long as he was alive, and
of course, I kept this promise. However, since Major General Beelitz died in 2002, the text of the interview
could be published in the Positio for the Cause of Beatifi cation of Pope Pius XII (printed in 2004), and there
is no reason why it should not come to the knowledge of a wider public.
Th e Events of October 16, 1943:
Th e roundup took place in the night from October 15 to 16, 1943. A woman, whose name is unknown
to me, heard the noise, looked out of her window, and saw what happened. Immediately, she informed
Princess Pignatelli Aragon Cortes, since she knew that the princess had access to Pope Pius XII. I personally
interviewed the princess who confi rmed all this to me. She contacted a young German diplomat, a certain
Wollenweber, and asked him to drive her in a German embassy car to the Vatican, since Rome was under
martial law and no civilian was allowed to be on the streets at that time, 7:00 a.m. Th is young German
diplomat was willing to drive her to the apostolic palace where the princess managed to get to Pius XII
who had just said the morning Mass in his private chapel. When he heard what happened, the Pope was
shocked and repeated several times that the SS had promised not to bother the Jews of Rome, so they had
acted contrary to their promise. Still in the presence of the princess, he called his secretary of state, Cardinal
Maglione, and ordered him to call the German ambassador at the Holy See, Ernst von Weizsäcker, into the Vatican immediately. About the following conversation between Cardinal Maglione and von Weizsäcker, the
cardinal wrote a protocol on the very same day, which was published in the Actes et Documents. Weizsäcker
urgently advised Maglione against any public protest, since this would only cause further damage. Instead,
he promised to do everything possible to stop the campaign against the Jews. In reality, Weizsäcker didn’t
do anything; and when his son, Richard von Weizsäcker, the former German president, claims today that his
father had recommended Maglione that the Pope should launch a protest, this is just not true; the opposite
is true, as the original protocol by Maglione proves.
Still, the Pope did not leave it with this but sent his nephew, Carlo Pacelli, to see General Stahel, and also
the Austrian bishop Alois Hudal, who was a persona non grata at the Vatican but had best contacts to
the Nazis. As a third measure, the Pope took the opportunity to send his confi dant and intermediary, the
superior general of the Salvatorians, Fr. Pankratius Pfeiff er, to Stahel; and this indeed might have moved
Stahel eventually to interfere personally in this aff air, what he did with success, as mentioned before. I say
with success, since due to the immediate stop of the arrests, it was eventually possible to invite thousands
of Jews to take refuge in buildings of the church, like universities, parish houses, monasteries, convents,
cloisters, and other institutes so that thousands of Jewish lives were saved, as was confi rmed repeatedly by
Jewish individuals and organizations.
Source: Pope Pius XII and World War II: The Documented Truth